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Dpreoccupation with the possibility of and modes of failure,
(2) reluctance to simplify interactions, (3) sensitivity to op-
erations, (4) a commitment to resilience, and (5) deference
to operational expertise. Effective communication is an es-
sential precondition to all of these factors, and in our opinion
communication improvement demands a conscious and in-
tentional approach with consideration of lessons learned in
such other high consequence industries as nuclear power,
aviation, and the military.
There are significant limitations to this study. The study
was performed in a single institution and with a small num-
ber of surgeons who were inclined to accept the value of im-
proved communication among team members. We were,
however, able to include a diversity of different surgeon–
perfusionist communication dyads, as well as a large number
of case types. A second limitation was the availability of
only 2 human factor observers, with no technical capability
to continuously record the actual exchanges in such a manner
that they could be ‘‘over read’’ or reviewed by other inves-
tigators. Both observers kept word-for-word records of the
communications between the surgeon and the perfusionist,
however, leaving the judgment of what did and did not con-
stitute a communication breakdown for later coding analysis
and discussion. Coding was performed independently, with
results compared only after all the data had been analyzed.
Finally, there is no means of accounting for the potential
for the Hawthorne effect of improved performance simply
because observers are present. This effect, however, would
have been expected to improve communication both before
and after institution of the protocol and should not, therefore,
invalidate our positive results.
More broadly, the results are limited by the interval of ob-
servation and the difficulty in assessing adherence to the pro-
tocol with time and its lasting impact on behavior in the OR.
True change in the culture of a complex environment is grad-
ual, and there is a tremendous pull toward return to the stable
state that existed before the intervention. Effective surgical
leadership is critical if such changes are to be incorporated
into the fabric of the environment. Perhaps the most impor-
tant element is demonstration to surgical trainees of the im-
portance and impact of effective communication exchange
as a critical element of teamwork.
In summary, the results of this study demonstrate that in
light of the complexity of cardiovascular care in the OR,
a sterile cockpit approach based on the definition of a critical
time interval is not as applicable as is an approach focused
on critical events. Furthermore, the institution of such a pro-
tocol had a positive effect on communication throughout the
procedure. Similar protocols should be readily customizable
to most practice environments, with no significant disruption
to the flow of the procedure itself because they do not con-
stitute a pause or checklist, and such interventions have
the potential to significantly improve outcomes.The Journal of Thoracic and CaWe gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Jeffrey Riley, CCP,
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Dr James I. Fann (Palo Alto, Calif). Dr Sundt, thank you for
a comprehensive and compelling presentation on this patient safety
issue. The concept of sterile cockpit is well established in the field
of aviation, with Federal Aviation Administration regulations
specifically mandating that pilots refrain from nonessential activi-
ties during critical phases of flight. In the context of surgery, on first
pass, one might consider the sterile cockpit model to be applicable
because of the common perception that the surgeon has a role anal-
ogous to that of the pilot. But is this aviation model of the sterile
cockpit directly applicable to the cardiac surgical environment?rdiovascular Surgery c Volume 139, Number 2 317
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DThat question, along with a potential solution in a communication
protocol, is thoughtfully analyzed in this study.
Errors in surgery and in medicine in general often can be traced
to errors in communication, as was mentioned, but such generalities
regarding the need for more effective communication have not pre-
viously translated into a well-designed study or a practical protocol
for improvement in the field of cardiothoracic surgery. The surgical
checklist, for instance, which is also based on the aviation model,
focuses on preoperative and postoperative debriefing and has
been shown to reduce errors and improve patient outcomes. Further
improvement in surgical outcomes will require us to recognize
other complex intraoperative components that make up the cardiac
surgical environment.
The importance of this study is twofold. It graphically demon-
strates the divergence and complexity of tasks among the diverse
team members. In effect, in the cardiac surgery environment, in
terms of the cognitive workload, instead of having a single cockpit
as is the case with aviation has multiple cockpits, with implications
for patient safety. It is well recognized that there are 3 tribes in the
surgical suite: anesthesia, surgery, and nursing. Additionally, in the
cardiac OR there is a subtribe, if you will, represented by the com-
plex interaction between the perfusionist and the surgeon. So in this
study the analysis focused on the surgical tribe in the surgical cock-
pit. Critical to our understanding of patient safety issues, the proto-
col for communication during CPB between the surgeon and the
perfusionist has been established to some degree.
First, Dr Sundt, in your analysis of the cognitive workload of
various participants in cardiac surgery and your use of the sterile
cockpit analogy, you propose that we regard critical events as op-
posed to critical intervals as being more appropriate. My first ques-
tion relates to the definition of ‘‘critical’’ and whether there is
a measurable threshold for such definition, in view of the variability
of what a given surgeon or anesthesiologist would consider a critical
event. Is there a reliable threshold for what you would consider
a critical event, given the variability of tasks and perceptions?
Dr Sundt. It’s hard to know the answer to that. We did it on the
basis of the potential impact of a problem at the time of that event, if
you will, a consensus agreement on the potential for harm. If we
screwed that step up, how bad would it be? We also looked at
how often there were miscommunications surrounding a given
event. I agree with you that this is an issue with all of this kind
of science, or social science. It is hard to measure these things.
Now if we accept that there is no standardized or completely objec-
tive way to determine critical events, the implication is that there
are multiple definitions. I can personally accept the notion that
from institution to institution the definitions of those critical events
may vary somewhat. But there is a limit, too. If the definitions vary
from OR to OR, from surgeon to surgeon, from anesthesiologist to
anesthesiologist, then we basically have the very state that we have
right now, which may work if one always has the exact same team
and everyone knows the definitions. But I don’t think that is going
to be an adequate answer in the long run. I think that in the end we
need to come to some agreements, at least within our own work
groups. It is an interactive process. In our institution, we work on
it, modify, and I think that we can come to some kind of common
ground in that way.
Dr Fann. Most surgeons and perfusionists have developed an
effective working relationship and means of communication with318 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgrespect to terminology, phraseology, call-back, nuances, and so
on. Given the number of surgeons and perfusionists in the study,
did you find in your subanalysis that there tended to a breakdown
in communication with particular combinations of surgeons and
perfusionists? If so, the communication protocol you developed
is actually a means of remediation for those individuals.
Dr Sundt. The surgeons and perfusionists involved in this study
were a subset of individuals who were open to doing this, so if any-
thing they are probably the people who were going to be most pli-
able and for whom the communication was already most reliable. I
mentioned the issue about ACT. If I can digress for a moment, we
changed a heparin administration protocol not too long ago, and the
next week I got complaints, ‘‘Oh, with this change we almost went
on CPB several times without giving heparin.’’ The question was,
how could this possibly happen? I asked the perfusionists how they
could institute CPB without an adequate ACT. The response I got
from the perfusionist was, ‘‘Well, Dr So-and-So goes on CPB with-
out asking what the ACT is.’’ I have to admit I asked the perfusion-
ist, ‘‘What do you mean Dr So-and-so goes on CPB? Aren’t you the
perfusionist? Aren’t you the one who turns on the machine?’’ Of
course, the perfusionists are not personally at fault—this is the cul-
ture in our institution, and I’ll bet that we are not unique. So I think
the answer to your question is that there are definitely very strong
differences among the surgeons regarding how open they are to
communication and how open the communication is in their
ORs. And, yes, I think that addressing this issue is very much the
intent of the work, to try and smooth that out. Because poor com-
munication in one OR spills over and affects what happens in an-
other OR.
Dr Fann. We know that when things get tough during surgery
such technically difficult components of the case are not always
known to the rest of the team because of inability of anyone but
the surgeon in many cases to visualize the situation and because
of the unpredictable nature of some of these events. In these situa-
tions, the surgeon would often communicate the critical nature of
the event to the rest of the team to minimize the amount of back-
ground noise and distraction. So, because of the unpredictable na-
ture of the critical events, especially during a long operation, and
the nature of multiple cockpits, based on your observations, have
you identified effective or not so effective methods that surgeons
use to communicate such critical events?
Dr Sundt. I think that the important principle there is that the
surgeon needs to communicate the criticality of the situation in
a way that actively engages everyone in the room, rather than dis-
engaging everyone in the room. Maybe this is more in the realm of
opinion than fact, but if we throw an instrument and it makes every-
body afraid to speak up, then we actually have not accomplished
our goal. Our goal really was to get everybody’s head in the
game. Instead, what we just got by throwing an instrument was
for everybody to check out of the room. There are better ways to
command attention. I think that we have all seen role models for
this in our training, people who commanded the attention of those
around them with their quiet manner. I think that is probably the
most effective way to get everybody actively engaged.
Dr Fann. Finally, what are the implications of your findings for
crew resource management training and crisis management training
in current patient simulation training? That is, crew resource man-
agement has been effective in anesthesia simulation, but simulationery c February 2010
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well. Please comment on this issue.
Dr Sundt. We are beginning to explore the use of simulation in
that axis. Harold Burkhart will actually discuss some of that tomor-
row, I think. We have a perfusion simulator in our simulation center
and are trying to get surgeons and perfusionists together there to
look at what those interactions are and how they occur.
Dr Kent Jones (Salt Lake City, Utah). I’ll be brief; I just have
one question. In you showed improvement in all categories except
that designated as miscues.
Dr Sundt. Miscues.The Journal of Thoracic and CaDr Jones. Yes. Would you not have expected that area to
improve with all the other categories that did show improvement?
Dr Sundt. The single category that did not show an improve-
ment was miscues. The difference between the frequencies was
not statistically significant, for what statistical significance is worth.
I would expect that certainly not to have been worse, so I can make
the excuse that it was not a statistically significant difference. The
incidence of those miscues was already pretty low, perhaps because
there was a Hawthorne effect in this. Everybody knew what we
were doing in the room, and so they were paying more attention,
but it turned out that the difference was not statistically significant.rdiovascular Surgery c Volume 139, Number 2 319
